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Abstract
Although the law is supposed to restrict warfare, it is instead
being used to justify aggressive and illegitimate interventions. It is
interesting to note that the convoluted nature of law and warfare
behaves differently in varying settings, and their relationship has
kept philosophers occupied for centuries. According to Thomas
Hobbes, humans’ bloodthirstiness has no limits in wars, and the
state of warfare is lawless; his argument has been refuted, most
prominently by Hugo Grotius, who maintained that, in addition to
the laws of individual states, there is also a law of nations that
regularizes the behavior of state interaction. In fact, the regulation
of wars by the “law of nations” has existed for thousands of years.
The law of wars is a necessary restraint that limits violence in
warfare and seeks to end wars. Hans Kelsen also sees law as a
mechanism to pacify a society, by restricting violence. So, the law
intends to enforce conditions that foster peace in the community.
Today, sovereign states are regularized by a super-sovereign (the
United Nations) by the concepts of jus ad bellum, enshrined in the
UN Charter, which regulates who can use force and in what
conditions, and jus in bello (international humanitarian law),
encoded in the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which proscribe the
ways in which force cannot be used, restricting the powers of
sovereign states and protecting innocent people during warfare.
However, recently, the volatile landscape of fighting terrorists and
nonstate actors (NSAs) in modern warfare has transformed the
dynamics of the international law of war. The line that marks the
difference between aggression and self-defense has been blurred.
Similarly, the excessive employment of NSAs and asymmetric
warfare techniques have blurred the distinction between
513
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combatants and noncombatants, making it difficult for the
international community to regularize efficiently the methods of
war and to restrict violence in warfare; and, thus, violence and
warfare are again on the rise. Therefore, it can be argued that the
Hobbesian theory of lawless war, though rebutted in theory, still
holds its ground in practice. Accordingly, the scope of this Article is
to disentangle the theoretical relationship between law and
warfare, to explore why the law is unable to restrict violence in
current times and how the law is being distorted to justify warfare.
To do so, this Article will examine the main challenges faced by the
international community to enforce the laws of war.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Whenever an armed conflict or warfare starts, the media and
the international community begin to assess its legitimacy under
the law. One side argues that the use of force is legal under
international law, while the other side contends that it is
illegitimate under the same rules because political understandings
and interpretations of law vary. Likewise, in a similar way to the
legitimacy of commencing a war, the lawfulness of individual
incidents during it is also scrutinized and documented to regularize
and humanize warfare, while protecting the innocent people caught
up in violence. For instance, in the discussion on the legality of
airstrikes in Syria, the aggressor alliance of U.K, U.S., and France
argued that due to the presence of persistent veto obstruction at the
Security Council, the airstrikes are justified to force Syria into
compliance with international obligation to not use chemical
weapons.1 Opposed to this narrative, the defensive side of Russia
maintained that in accordance with international law, this
intervention flagrantly violated the prohibition on the use of force.2
In both cases, the law and warfare are the common factors discussed
in relation to each other. The international law of warfare
completely prohibits all forms that resort to the use of force,3 except
defensively or with the authorization of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) in situations where the peace and security of the
world are threatened.4 Moreover, international humanitarian law
(IHL) regularizes warfare by protecting all civilians and innocent
people from the horrors of warfare.5 For example, it requires both

* Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
1. Marc Weller, Syria Airstrikes: Were They Legal?, BBC NEWS, (Apr. 14,
2018) www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43766556.
2. Id.
3. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
4. Id. arts. 2, para. 4; 51; 41–49.
5. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague,
I) art. X, July 29, 1899; Convention for the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Hague, II) art. X, July 29, 1899; Convention for the Opening of Hostilities
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sides of a conflict to avoid deliberately targeting civilian objects,6 to
take precautions while executing military actions,7 and to be
proportional in the use of force.8 While the law prohibits aggression9
and protects the innocent during warfare through IHL,10 warfare
and associated atrocities never cease to exist. As a result, hundreds
of thousands of people are dying in warfare,11 and millions more are
affected and dispersed by warfare.12 As Grotius established, in
accordance with the correct interpretation of international law,13
one party to an armed conflict has to be in the wrong and the
aggressor, because it cannot be the case that both sides have just
cause.14 Arguably, in all of this violence and warfare, where
innocent people are being affected, there have to be perpetrators
and war criminals responsible for disturbing and threatening the
peace and security of this world. And, if the law is perfect, then why
is there still violence, and why are innocent civilians affected? Why
are violence and warfare not controlled by the law? Why is the law
not able to regularize warfare properly? Why are aggressive wars
(Hague, III) art. X, October 18, 1907; Convention for the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Hague, IV) art. X, October 18, 1907; see also Geneva Convention
I: For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, art. X, August 12, 1949; Geneva Convention II: For the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. X, August 12, 1949; Geneva Convention III: Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. X, August 12, 1949; Geneva
Convention IV: Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. X, August 12, 1949; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. X, June 8, 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. X, June 8, 1977; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III) art. X, Dec. 8, 2005.
6. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 48 [hereinafter AP1].
7. Id. art. 57.
8. Id. art. 57(2).
9. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
10. See supra note 5.
11. About the Syrian Refugee Crisis, GLOBAL IMPACT, www.syriarelief.chari
ty.org/?gcli=EAIaIQobChMI19TaqLzh5QIVBUTTCh3ilwFPEAAYASAAEgIUb
vD_BwE#.Xcj3t1czbIU (last updated May 29, 2020) (“More than 500,000 people
have died since the war began.”).
12. See Syria Emergency, UNHCR: UN REFUGEE AGENCY, www.unhcr.org
/syria-emergency.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2018) (“Over 5.6 million people
have fled Syria since 2011, seeking safety in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and
beyond. Millions more are displaced inside Syria and, as war continues, hope is
fading fast.”); see also Syria Regional Refugee Response, OPERATIONAL PORTAL:
REFUGEE SITUATIONS, www.data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria (last updated
June 11, 2020) (emphasizing that “5,543,746 (5.5 million) Syrian refugees are
hosted in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt”).
13. PETER PAVEL REMEC, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO GROTIUS AND VATTEL 120 (1960).
14. JOHN YOO, POINT OF ATTACK: PREVENTIVE WAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND GLOBAL WELFARE 57 (2014).
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and illegal invasions continuously waged? Why is the law unable to
protect civilians from the horrors of warfare? Why are sovereign
states not sheltered against aggressions and illegitimate
interventions?
To find answers to these questions, the scope of this Article is
to explore the relationship between law and warfare. This Article
intends to explore why there is a huge gap between war in practice
and the law on paper. It is pertinent to mention here that the scope
of this Article is not to list all the laws of war, to show how law
regularizes warfare, or to assess how the law protects civilians
during warfare. In short, this Article does not intend to investigate
what international law says about the legality of the use of force.
Instead, the scope of this Article is mainly to set out the theoretical
relationship between law and warfare, to explore why there is a gap
between what the international law of war states on paper and what
states do on the battlefield; and that, too, will be touched upon in
respect of academic theoretical reasons and arguments, and not to
list all violations or document the size of the gap.
To do this, this Article is divided into four sections. Section 1
will explore the ideology of law in warfare. This section will discuss
the theoretical aspects of the relationship between law and warfare,
to explain how and when law is involved with armed conflicts. Then,
Section 2 will discuss the concept of reciprocity in relation to the
nexus between law and warfare. This section is divided into three
subsections. Section 2.1 will discuss the law in relation to
compliance in international relations, Section 2.2 will discuss the
dilemma involved in the choice of reciprocity, and Section 2.3 will
discuss reciprocity in warfare. Afterwards, Section 3 will explore the
nature of the humanization of law in relation to warfare. This
section is further divided into four subsections. Section 3.1 will
discuss the challenges posed by non-state actors (NSAs) to the
humanization of warfare by law. Section 3.2 will discuss the
challenge of compliance in the international legal system. Section
3.3 will discuss the role of technology as a challenge to the
humanization of warfare through law. Lastly, Section 3.4 will
discuss the challenge of the heavy costs borne by one side in
respecting international law. Then, Section 4 will discuss the
regularization of warfare by law. This section has two subsections,
Section 4.1 will discuss the challenge of misinterpretations of law
regarding military targets and Section 4.2 will explore the challenge
of enforcing the law during warfare.

II. IDEOLOGY OF LAW IN WARFARE
According to Thomas Hobbes, humans’ bloodthirstiness has no
limits in wars, and the state of warfare is lawless.15 He argues that
15. Lawrence Douglas et al., Law and War: An Introduction, in LAW AND
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law is the necessary restraint that limits violence in warfare and
that seeks to end wars.16 For Hobbes, the law is the exclusive
domain of states, and therefore there can be no law if there is no
state.17 This essential convergence of “law and state” shows how
states behave in the same way as individuals do within a society.
Of course, states can agree on terms by signing a treaty, just as
individuals sign contracts among themselves. But the contracts or
treaties do not mean anything if there is no higher authority to
enforce the terms of such agreements. In international law, the
United Nations, particularly its Security Council, can be deemed
such a super-authority on states as an enforcing agency, equivalent
to a government for individuals. This super-authority is sovereign,
and it limits the use of force among all states.
Hans Kelsen also has a similar view. He believes that the law
not only tries to prevent armed conflicts between states; it also
restricts all forms of violence in the daily lives of individuals living
in a civil society.18 Criminal law and the states’ prohibition on
individuals’ use of force are prime examples of these concords. To
take murder as an example, the law prohibits the use of force to kill
any person, and by this it restricts violence. But what about cases
of revenge? Of course, killing in self-defense is allowed in criminal
law to safeguard an individual’s sovereignty, just as the right to use
defensive force in international law does.19 However, killing in
revenge is not permitted under criminal law.20 In this way, a state
ensures its monopoly on the use of force by prohibiting the use of
force by individuals. Therefore, only a state has the authority to
avenge a death under the law.21 In a similar way to Hobbes, Kelsen
sees law as a mechanism to pacify a society, by restricting
violence.22 So, the law intends to enforce conditions that foster peace
in the community.23
Carl Schmitt also took a Hobbesian view of a state as a
limitless sovereign.24 Schmitt believed that a state is not
constrained by the governing laws it has made; it is above them.
Like Hobbes, he does not see governance as defining sovereignty,
WAR 1, 4 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014).
16. Id.
17. DAVID DAICHES RAPHAEL, HOBBES: MORALS AND POLITICS (1977),
reprinted in POLITICAL THINKERS 50 (Geraint Parry ed., 2004).
18. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 91-99 (Max Knight trans., 2005);
see also Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 6.
19. U.N. Charter art. 51.
20. See Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 6. (“[T]he state must punish the
murderer to eliminate the prospect of retaliatory violence and blood vengeance
. . . .”).
21. Id.
22. See KELSEN, supra note 18, at 91–99; see also Douglas et al., supra note
15, at 6 (noting that Kelsen viewed the law “as an instrument that aims at the
pacification of the legal community”).
23. KELSEN, supra note 18, at 36–39. Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 6.
24. Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 6.
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but the state holds supremacy in governance within its territory.25
For him, the sovereign is the one who “decides the exception [state
of emergency] which cannot be subsumed.”26 By this he meant that
no self-codification or rule applies to a state in a state of emergency,
defying the rule of law.27 Schmitt’s definition helps us locate the
sovereign as an entity who decides to apply the law, revoke it, and
then reinstate it. Here, Schmitt’s so-called emergency is the state of
war, where the powers of a sovereign are challenged. Because
armed conflict/war is an existential threat, it provides the
opportunity for a state to exercise its powers and do anything it
deems reasonable for the sake of survival. So, in peacetime, law
governs everything, whereas in the state of emergency during wars
there is lawlessness. Yet, in both scenarios, the powers of a
sovereign prevail as absolute authority.28 But the Hobbesian
argument that warfare is not ruled by any law has been refuted
because war has been regulated by law for thousands of years.29
The best rebuttal to the Hobbesian notion of the lawlessness of
war was pioneered by Hugo Grotius, who maintained that, in
addition to the laws of individual states, there is also a law of
nations, which regularizes the behavior of state interaction. He
established that even the law of nations without sanctions is not
wholly ineffective or meaningless.30 Although Grotius’s works fuse
morality and law, and they implicitly deem trade agreements to be
legal norms, they still provide a strong foundation to refute
Hobbesian arguments. Grotius adds that law must only be
undertaken after conscientiously trying to avert it, and that the
conduct of warfare should be strictly regularized by the law because
he believed that people go to war for little or no reason, and use
violence in the most barbaric ways.31 So he introduced the notions
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum describes the
requirements to judge the justification of a war, and jus in bello is
the conduct of war, which regularizes military action with regard to
humanitarian rules.32
25. See Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 6–7 (recognizing that Schmitt
“embraced Hobbes’s understanding of sovereign power as absolute and
illimitable”).
26. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY II: THE MYTH OF THE CLOSURE OF
ANY POLITICAL THEOLOGY 4-16 (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward trans., 2008).
27. See Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 7 (providing that the invocation of
a state of emergency “signifies the purest instance of the exercise of sovereign
power”).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 472 (Keith C. Culver ed., 1999).
31. 3 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: LATE MEDIEVAL
AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY 333 (2003); see also ARNOLD KRAMMER, WAR
CRIMES, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 28 (2010); RELIGION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999);
Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 8–9.
32. Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 8–9.
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Since then, the laws of nations have improved drastically, to
incorporate both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Today, sovereigns
are regularized by the super-sovereign by the jus ad bellum
enshrined in the UN Charter, which regulates who can use force
and in what conditions;33 and the humanitarian laws of war encoded
in the Geneva and Hague Conventions proscribe the ways in which
force cannot be used, restricting the powers of a sovereign state.34
The UNSC, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) seek to enforce these
international laws. The idea is to restrict violence among sovereign
states and to humanize warfare while nurturing conditions to
assure peace and security. In jus ad bellum, under the UN Charter,
the law prohibits all forms of the use of force by sovereign states,35
with the exception of the use of force in self-defense and with the
authorization of the UNSC in cases where the peace and security of
the international community is threatened.36 In jus in bello, the
principles of proportionality,37 precaution,38 and distinction39
protect noncombatants from the excesses of violence, by restricting
the methods of force in a humanitarian fashion.
However, recently, the volatile nature of fighting terrorists and
NSAs has transformed the dynamics of modern international laws
of war seeking to restrict violence. The line that marks the
difference between aggression and self-defense has been blurred,40
as has the distinction between combatants and noncombatants,
through the excessive employment of NSAs and asymmetric
warfare techniques.41 This transformation is making it difficult for
the international community to efficiently regularize war and to
restrict warfare/violence; violence and warfare are again on the rise.
Consequently, it can be argued that the Hobbesian theory of lawless
war, though refuted in theory, still holds ground in practice.
More importantly, this paradigm shift in the methods of
fighting a war has blurred the lines between wartime and

33. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 41-51 (asserting that “[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”).
34. See supra note 5.
35. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
36. Id. arts. 41–49.
37. AP1, supra note 5, art. 57(2).
38. Id. art. 57.
39. Id. art. 48.
40. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 107 (2010).
41. ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 203 (Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans, & Adam
Henschke eds., 2013); see also DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE
DYNAMICS OF COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF
MILITARY MIGHT 196 (2002).
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peacetime,42 making wars look like policing actions. Blum argues
that this shift has shattered the foundational basis upon which the
laws of war were constructed. She fears that the internalization of
international policing can be domesticated as well.43 Furthermore,
this Article is concerned that such policing relaxes the conditions
set for the international use of force, meaning that, even where the
use of force or policing by liberal democracies is justified, the
instigation of violence and war has become easier, lowering the legal
standard for jus ad bellum.
Moreover, liberals saw the actions in the American war on
terror under the Bush regime as illegal, owing to the excessive use
of torture, and indefinite detention, while conservatives saw it as a
“hypertrophy of law.”44 Moyn established that both stances
misrepresent the history of American warfare.45 To him, unlike
Grotius or the language used at the Nuremburg trials, jus in bello
is more important than jus ad bellum. He quotes the literature on
the Vietnam War, which greatly emphasizes its “undeclared,
aggressive” and illegal nature, while ignoring carpet bombing and
the behavior toward prisoners of war.46 Nevertheless, he admits
that too much emphasis on jus in bello “humanizes” warfare, and
the law on warfare first focuses on jus ad bellum before coming to
jus in bello.47 Because, if there is no war at all, there can be no war
crimes.
So, a possible new research question is: do the modern methods
of fighting warfare affect the jus ad bellum criteria and justify
illegal wars? Or is it the other way around: that aggressive states
first develop new strategies to exploit the lacunas in the legal
system of warfare, and then they employ or develop asymmetric
tactics of warfare? Either way, the goal of this Article is to
disentangle the relationship between law and warfare; it proposes
that methods of warfare are cleverly designed to overcome the
restriction on the use of force, for which vague customary
international laws and state practices are developed and exploited
to justify the illegal use of force or illegitimate interventions.
The international law of using force prohibits all kinds of use
of force, with the exception of the use of force in self-defense and
with authorization of the UNSC.48 So, when neither of these
42. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF
IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008); Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 14.

JUSTICE

43. Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From War to Policing in
the Regulation of Armed Conflicts, in LAW AND WAR 48, 77 (Austin Sarat et al.
eds., 2014).
44. See Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 16–17.
45. Samuel Moyn, From Antiwar Politics to Anti-Torture Politics, in LAW
AND WAR, 178 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014).
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also, Douglas et al., supra note 15, at 17-18 (noting that Moyn
“regards this shift with ambivalence”).
48. U.N. Charter arts. 2, para. 4; 51; 41–49.
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requirements is met under jus ad bellum, aggressive countries
resort to establishing new norms through the opinions of scholars
who support their aggressive warfare, or through the development
of newly found customary international law. New principles or
norms under international law of using force have to be developed
because by the time a new war is waged, the legal reasoning
previously used has been deconstructed or rebuffed by the
international community. For instance, the principles of the
responsibility to protect (“R2P”),49 humanitarian intervention50
(without UNSC authorization), and preventive self-defense51 were
wrongly used to justify illegal warfare by aggressive states. Indeed,
over time, all uses of force based on these principles were rejected
and deconstructed by the international community, if undertaken
without self-defense and without UNSC authorization. In current
times, the unwilling or unable test52 is being used in the Syrian War
to justify the use of force without an actual armed attack from the
Syrian state.
In the Syrian War, the Syrian state did not use armed force
against the U.S. or launch any armed attack on the U.S., and the
UNSC did not authorize the use of force. So the U.S. cannot use
force in self-defense or rely on UNSC authorization. The U.S.,
therefore, used force in Syria by arguing that the NSAs in Syria
carried out armed attacks in Iraq, so the U.S. is only using force in
Iraq’s collective self-defense.53 This seems quite straightforward.
But does international law allow the defensive use of force in cases
of armed attacks by NSAs, such as the defensive use of force in
reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror? In
this regard, the major instrument of international law (the UN
Charter) is silent. But the ICJ explicitly provides an effective
control test. If it can be established that the use of force by NSAs is
used under the effective control of a state, then the defensive use of
force in response to an armed attack by NSAs is justified.54 But
49. David Chandler, Unravelling the Paradox of the Responsibility to Protect,
20 IRISH STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 27–39 (2009).
50. Jana Dadova, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention Without UN
Security Council Authorization (May 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the University of Southern Denmark).
51. Kevin Jon Heller, Why Preventive Self-Defense Violates the UN Charter,
OPINIOJURIS (Mar. 7, 2012), www.opiniojuris.org/2012/03/07/why-preventiveself-defense-violates-the-un-charter [hereinafter Heller].
52. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, International Law and the Application of the
Unwilling or Unable Test in the Syrian Conflict, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 61 (2018)
[hereinafter Qureshi, International Law]; see also Waseem Ahmad Qureshi,
Examining the Legitimacy and Reasonableness of the Use of Force: From Just
War Doctrine to the Unwilling-or-Unable Test, 42 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 221
(2018).
53. Qureshi, International Law, supra note 52, at 85.
54. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 61-65 (June 27) (utilizing the effective control
test).
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what about situations where the NSAs are not under the effective
control of a state? Should there be no action or law enforcement
against such terrorists? Using this argument, Ashley Deeks
comprised a new test, called the “unwilling or the unable test,” in
which a victim state can use defensive force in response to armed
attacks by NSAs if the host state where the NSAs reside is either
unwilling or is unable to deal with the perpetrators.55 When the law
is subjugated and bent in such a fashion, it is used as a tool to
authorize aggressive wars, and when the law is used to humanize
and regulate warfare through humanitarian rules, it is used as a
restraint.

III. RECIPROCITY
A. Reciprocity and Compliance in International
Relations
While domestic legal systems enforce obligations involving
individuals, the notion of reciprocity in international law, especially
in the law of warfare, is concerned with the legal obligations
between states.56 Reciprocity is used in international agreements to
enforce cooperation and to deter violations,57 by levying reciprocal
state obligations. Empirical data has shown evidence of reciprocity
even in state practice in international relations.58 But states’
responses become disproportionate and irregular when it is difficult
to monitor a subject’s compliance. This difficulty in monitoring is
known as the “noise.”59 The noise is directly proportional to the
irregularity in the reciprocity of responses in international
relations. The higher the noise is, the higher the irregularity in
reciprocity, and vice versa.60 Compared to reciprocity, legal
obligations have less effect on compliance; reciprocity is statistically
proven to be more efficient in deterring violations and ensuring
states’ compliance.61 Does this mean that developing laws of
reciprocal responses will help in shaping an international legal
55. Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extra-Territorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012).
56. For more detailed analyses of how the principle of reciprocity manages
obligations between states in the laws of war, see Sean Watts, Reciprocity and
the Laws of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365 (2009) (furnishing a detailed overview
on reciprocal obligations in the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions,
customary international law, and other laws of war).
57. ROGER HOPKINS BURKE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
137 (2012).
58. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN & JOHN R. FREEMAN, THREE-WAY STREET:
STRATEGIC RECIPROCITY IN WORLD POLITICS 26-29 (1990).
59. Id. at 27
60. JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER WITHIN ANARCHY: THE LAWS OF WAR AS AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION 128 (2014).
61. Id. at 131, 144.
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system where states are more prone to comply and less likely to
violate their obligations?

B. Reciprocity Dilemma in Compliance
If we see the laws of war in general, it is clear that the
governing rules of jus ad bellum are in themselves in line with
reciprocity. For instance, we start with the prohibition on the use of
force and its only exception in self-defense. Jus ad bellum does not
allow any sort of use of force against other states, but it does allow
the right to use reciprocal force to all states in self-defense if they
are victim to an armed attack.62
The problem with reciprocity is similar to the prisoner’s
dilemma, in which two rational beings are likely not to cooperate
with each other because both of them are better off by not
cooperating at the expense of each other.63 So, to take an example
of states, suppose the U.S. and China agree to exchange x and y. If
x and y are exchanged successfully, both are better off. But, if the
U.S. cooperates and China does not, then China will end up with x
and y, which is better for it than the ideal exchange, where it will
only get x or y. It suits the interest of both parties to not cooperate.
But if both parties do not cooperate, they are worse off. So how
should we induce compliance or cooperation between states in this
situation? Here, reciprocity plays its role. If one state does not
cooperate, the next time the other state will not cooperate. This is
the classic example of “tit for tat.” After reaching the lowest levels
of noncooperation, states will start to comply with each other,
knowing that noncooperation will only damage their interests in the
long run and that the short-term benefits of noncooperation are
inadequate.64 Here, the law can play the role of reciprocity by
levying punishments for violations to induce compliance. This will
maintain the long-term ethical work relationship and will
proportionally affect both parties. But the practice is not as plain
and simple as this model.
So, let us add some noise within this model. In real life, one
party is aware of the cooperation or compliance of the other party.
An error can also come that seems like a violation but is not. In
response, a party with a skeptical mind, or by error, might imagine
that the agreement is violated and choose to violate the agreement
in response. The other party, not having broken its obligation, will
see this behavior as a violation, and the prisoner’s dilemma
continues again down the same spiral we started with. In this
regard, the law can set trigger levels of violations with appropriate
62. U.N. Charter art. 51.
63. See MORROW, supra note 60, at 290 (referring to his Chapter 2 discussion
on Prisoner’s Dilemma Nash Equilibria & Pareto Optimal).
64. For a more thorough analysis on the game theory, prisoner’s dilemma,
and reciprocity with mathematical equations, see id. at 23-57.
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reciprocal levels of punishments. However, increasing the trigger
levels would mean that the uncertainly period is larger, and the
chances of noncooperation are higher; by contrast, reducing trigger
levels would translate into small violations and disproportionate
responses, because, if one side violates one little obligation, the
response can be a major deviation from cooperation. So, the law also
needs to make certain that the punishments and violation trigger
levels are proportionate and equally applicable to both sides,
regardless of how much the other party deviated. This means that
cooperation can be induced by levying punishments individually,
irrespective of the violations of the other party.65 But it does not
make sense that one party would comply and cooperate fully when
the other party is violating its obligations. The legal system or
agreement can incorporate the kind of individual response or
cooperation that is expected from the other party at which stage, to
nullify the dilemma of noncooperation and to impose punishments
accordingly. Here, law, particularly the international legal system,
has a duty to form “bright lines” for cooperation, punishments, and
violations. Treaty law, for example, forms binding rules that states
agree with, after ratification. Moreover, international law also
forms principles for such dealings that can be used in the event of
dispute/conflict between states.66

C. Warfare
The concept of reciprocity in law and warfare can be tested by
the international laws of war. As has been seen, individual soldiers
in armed conflicts reciprocate and respond to the actions and
violations of their enemies, such as the treatment of wounded
soldiers and prisoners of war.67 But reciprocity is not very useful in
international laws of neutrality during warfare, IHL during
occupation, or in cases of terrorism and the use of
biological/chemical weapons. As Morrow argues, if one state has
violated the law of neutrality or IHL, the other is not likely to
respond by violating the rights of neutrality of the other state, or by
violating international humanitarian laws; and, during occupation,
one state may not possess the capabilities to effect a reciprocal
occupation.68 However, it is not necessary that a state will exactly
mirror a violation or adversity. It is also possible to reciprocate
violations through other forms of retaliation. For instance, if one
weak state has been attacked by a cruise missile and it does not
possess the capability to respond in kind, it will retaliate by using
other kinds of force, such as by using rocket launchers. But

65. Id. at 290.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 73, 196.
68. Id. at 148.
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reciprocity in the form of retaliation is guaranteed.69
Adding noise to the state of individual behavior in violations of
international laws of using force makes the matter of reciprocity
more complicated. For instance, during the Second World War
Japanese used perfidy to fight enemy forces.70 Similarly, terrorists
use suicide bombs and other forms of asymmetric means during
armed conflicts and in peacetime. Since states do not publicly
announce their intention to violate IHL, and terrorist activities are
so unpredictable, are gross violations of humanitarian law, and are
committed through clandestine means, it is nearly impossible for
victim states to respond and reciprocate. However, this does not
mean that a victim state cannot retaliate against such actions by
any other means, for instance by using force while respecting
humanitarian law, by litigation, or by enforcement of punishments
against war crimes. While such retaliation cannot be truly
considered reciprocal, it can still be perceived as a weaker form of
reciprocity in warfare, because, as discussed earlier, a slap in
response to a punch is a form of reciprocity. It does not matter that
the form and technique of a response are different.
For instance, a drone attack on a group of terrorists hiding in
a cave that results in the deaths of ten terrorists can be considered
a reciprocal response to a suicide attack that killed numerous
innocent people and was planned and executed by those terrorists.
It can be argued that the deaths of terrorists are worth less than
the casualties of innocent people, so it is not proportional or
reciprocal in a true sense. Likewise, it can also be argued that the
innocent people did not commit any wrong, while the terrorists
wronged those innocent people, so justice is still not reciprocal even
if the death toll on both sides is the same. But this is the case with
every mass murder; if A murders B and C, and A is subsequently
captured and executed, there is still injustice. In this example, both
A and B die equally, and, even if the deaths are reciprocated in a
similar manner, what about the injustice to C committed by A?
While Hitler killed millions of Jews, in reciprocity he only died once;
what about the justice for the remaining millions of people who died
at the hands of Hitler? Only religious beliefs, such as the notions of
heaven and hell, and life after death, can reciprocate for mass
murders in a true sense.
This discussion only makes two major points: One, that the
international law of using force including law pertaining to the war
crimes, IHL, and jus ad bellum, are reciprocal in nature; and, two,
that reciprocity does not mean exactly mirroring a situation in
response; rather, in the relationship of law and warfare, reciprocity
is a form of retaliation that is proportional and responsive in nature.

69. See id. at 139 (recognizing a 95% chance of retaliation in face of
violations from other side).
70. Id. at 228.
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States’ behavior is not solely administered through the concept of
reciprocity, in that state A is afraid to use force against state B for
fear of responsive force from state B. Although reciprocity plays an
important role in the international relations of using force, states’
responsibilities and legal obligations also determine and affect their
actions.71 This explains why, in cases of violations of IHL, states do
not choose to reciprocate with violations, since the legal obligations
to humanize warfare are internalized in states’ behaviors.72
However, it would be interesting to see how the addition of noise
with regard to violations of IHL affect the internalization of legal
obligations: does an increase in violations of IHL decrease the sense
of internalized legal obligations?

IV. HUMANIZATION
The law of war intends to humanize warfare by imposing
humanitarian principles that restrict the use of violence toward
civilians and innocent people. The progressive international law
community, therefore, keeps on refining the legal principles to
humanize warfare.73 Contrary to these efforts, the international law
of warfare is becoming less relevant every day because, firstly, the
powerful states that aggressively use force do not respect their legal
obligations in international law. For instance, the interventions and
wars commenced by the U.S. (which is the major global actor in all
aspects) have hardly been affected by any international law of war,
both in terms of civilian casualties74 and in terms of initiations of
wars.75 Secondly, NSAs, and the terrorist organizations that employ
71. Id. at 131.
72. Id.
73. Sarah Sewall, Limits of Law: Promoting Humanity in Armed Conflicts,
in LAW AND WAR 23 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014).
74. To see humanitarian violations and United States conduct during the
Iraq War, see Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in
Iraq, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 11, 2003), www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target
/conduct-war-and-civilian-casualties-iraq.
75. For support that the United States initiated the Iraq War on false
grounds, see Cheney Blasts Media on Al Qaeda-Iraq Link, CNN (June 18, 2004),
www.edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/18/cheney.iraq.al.qaeda; see also
Andy McSmith & Charlie Cooper, Chilcot Report: Blair Didn’t Tell Truth About
WMDs, the Deal with Bush or the Warnings of Fallout – How Britain Went to
War in Iraq, INDEP. (July 6, 2016), www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
chilcot-report-inquiry-tony-blair-iraq-war-weapons-of-mass-destructionevidence-verdict-a7122361.html; Aaron Rupar, 60 Minutes: CIA Official
Reveals Bush, Cheney, Rice Were Personally Told Iraq Had No WMD in Fall
2002, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 24, 2006), www.thinkprogress.org/60-minutes-ciaofficial-reveals-bush-cheney-rice-were-personally-told-iraq-had-no-wmd-infall-2002-9d3bf033c619; Sean Lengell, Durbin Kept Silent on Prewar
Knowledge,
WASH.
TIMES
(Apr.
27,
2007),
www.web.arch
ive.org/web/20070429045319/http://washtimes.com/national/20070427-1248421706r.htm; White House ‘Warned over Iraq Claim,’ BBC NEWS, www.new
s.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3056626.stm (last updated July 9, 2003); Dave Moniz
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them, also do not abide by the humanitarian legal principles that
protect civilians, and they violate all the basic legal principles
without any fear.76 So there is both the non-compliant attitude of
NSAs and superpowers toward their legal obligations under IHL
and the UN Charter and a lack of law enforcement to punish war
crimes or aggressors. The extent of this issue can be understood by
the U.S. attitude toward war crimes and respect for international
law: the U.S. threatened to arrest ICC judges if they tried to pursue
cases of American war crimes.77 The legal system that ensures
peace and deters violence is useless when it comes to superpower
aggressor states: even if it is known that a war was initiated on the
wrong premises, and even if the aggressor itself acknowledges its
mistake, the superpower perpetrators are not held accountable by
the international community. For instance, in the Iraq War, the
U.S. admitted that the war was initiated on false intelligence and
forged documents of weapons of mass destruction.78 Yet, the Bush
administration was never held accountable, and there were no
sanctions levied on the U.S. for its complete disrespect for the UN
Charter and war crimes. Had it been a weaker state, such as Iran,
hundreds of sanctions, plus a full-fledged American invasion with
dozens of allies against Iran, would have been inevitable. Therefore,
the international community should now not focus on the
progression or refinement of the legal obligations in international
law. Instead, a more sensible goal should be to work toward the
practicality of legal obligations, and toward compliance,
enforcement,79 and punishment for war crimes. Only then will the
law have any sort of value; law without enforcement is just ink on
paper. If the law forbids the aggressive use of force, and
superpowers can get away with it every time, then why would other
states or NSAs respect the law?

A. Nonstate Actors
There are a number of challenges that lay the foundations of a
non-compliant and disrespectful attitude toward IHL. The first is
the existence of NSAs, who not only threaten states’ monopoly on
the use of force but have also always been outside legal control in
& Peronet Despeignes, O’Neill: Iraq Planning Came Before 9/11, USA TODAY
(Jan. 12, 2004), www.usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-01-11oneill-iraq_x.htm; Daniel Schorr, The Downing Street Memos, NPR (June 19,
2005), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4709618.
76. Id.
77. US Threatens to Arrest ICC Judges if They Pursue Americans for Afghan
War Crimes, FRANCE24, www.france24.com/en/20180910-usa-trump-threatensarrest-icc-judges-american-soldiers-afghan-war-crimes (last updated Sept. 11,
2018).
78. See supra note 75.
79. See Sewall, supra note 73, at 25 (noting complications in prosecuting U.S
war criminals to enforce humanitarian law).
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international law.80 It is expected that, in the future, the numbers
of NSAs in warfare will only grow, so this problem will definitely
deteriorate. Nonstate organizations such as the Taliban, Al Qaeda,
ISIS, insurgents, drug cartels, and rebel groups routinely violate all
their IHL obligations, by deliberately targeting civilian people.81
These organizations are illegal from the start, explicitly fighting
their own and other states, so they do not respect any law, whether
domestic or international, and this frees them from all sorts of legal
obligations. Agreements can be drafted and signed with these
organizations to oblige them under IHL to use humane force, but
doing so would translate into admitting that their resorting to the
use of force is legitimate, and it would threaten the monopoly of the
state to use force. And, even if ISIS-like organizations agree to not
target civilians, the law enforcement problems will remain if they
ultimately breach that agreement: with or without agreements,
they should not be violating IHL. Therefore, the focus of the law and
warfare relationship should not be on tightening the legal
obligations but on enforcing existing IHL requirements. By way of
analogy, if a criminal comes and robs a bank, believing he is not
obliged by state laws, there is little advantage in the state
responding by signing agreements with the criminal not to rob
banks again, because the law already says that robbing banks is
illegal. Now, his arrest and punishment are required. So the
argument here is that NSAs are already bound by IHL
requirements, as the customary international law of IHL is
universal with regard to its jurisdiction.82 But, if it is so simple that
only law enforcement is left, then why are NSAs thriving and not
being arrested or punished by their host states or the international
community? Despite the U.S. spending billions of dollars83 fighting
NSAs, terrorism is growing exponentially in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Syria, and Yemen. Does this mean that the methods used to fight
terrorism are ineffective? Or is there something more to it?
Terrorism is increasing because the so-called enemies of terrorism
are also fueling it behind their backs. For instance, while the U.S.
is fighting ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, it is at the same time
fighting the system that deters terrorism, by destabilizing states
and by sponsoring and aiding NSAs,84 whether in the form of U.S.
80. Id. at 23, 25.
81. Id.
82. ROBERT KOLB, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 65 (2014).
83. Reality Check Team, Afghanistan War: What Has the Conflict Cost the
US?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2020), www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821.
84. House Approves US Arms for Syrian Rebels, AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 17,
2014), www.america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/17/congress-arming-syriare
bels.html; see also Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret US
Support for Syrian Rebels, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012), www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-syria-obama-order/exclusive-obama-authorizes-secret-u-s-sup
port-for-syrian-rebels-idUSBRE8701OK20120801; Mark Mazzetti, Adam
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support to NSAs and indirect flow of weapons to terrorist
organizations85 or by arming rebel and insurgent groups against the
host state. For instance, in Syria, the U.S. is supporting rebel
groups to change the Assad regime; American arms support to
Syrian rebels ends up in the hands of terrorists.86 Similarly,
Western support to rebel factions in Syria to topple the Assad
regime is also destabilizing Syrian state capabilities in their fight
against terrorist groups. So Western political tactics are not
efficient in fighting terrorism; in fact, they are the complete
opposite, as they are counterproductively increasing terrorism by
providing them with support.
In conclusion, the biggest challenge in the enforcement and
compliance of IHL is the involvement of NSAs in armed conflicts,
used by both superpowers and weak states as proxies to affect their
political will. And, since NSAs act outside all legal obligations, the
law is not enforced against them. NSAs are exploited and used by
states for various reasons, the most significant of which is to avoid
attribution or retribution against the actions undertaken by NSAs.
Aside from this, NSAs are used by states for their cost-effectiveness
and their effective armed attacks. Since NSAs do not respect any
IHL, their actions are highly effective in fighting a targeted state.
A simple solution to all this disarray would be a complete ban on
the use of NSAs and on the clandestine use of armed forces without
uniforms. Any sort of help, support, and training provided to NSAs
by any state should not only be banned; it should be considered a
war crime that should be enforced by and deterred by imposing high
sanctions and punishments.

B. Compliance
The second problem with the enforcement of law of warfare and
IHL is with the compliance by states, mainly those at the extreme
ends of military strength. Weak states use asymmetric tactics to

Goldman & Michael S. Schmidt, Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret
C.I.A. War in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), www.nytimes.c
om/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html; Mark
Mazzetti, C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian
Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/u
s/politics/cia-study-says-arming-rebels-seldom-works.html; C.J. Chivers & Eric
Schmitt, Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, with Aid from C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/world/middleeast/arms-airlift-to
-syrian-rebels-expands-with-cia-aid.html.
85. Brian Castner, Exclusive: Tracing ISIS’ Weapons Supply Chain—Back
to the US, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2017), www.wired.com/story/terror-industrial-c
omplex-isis-munitions-supply-chain; see also Tara McKelvey, Arming Syrian
Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2015), www. bbc.co
m/news/magazine-33997408.
86. See supra note 84.
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overcome their weaknesses in military power,87 while superpowers
argue they have not violated the standards of their international
legal obligations by finding new lacunas in the system.88 In both
cases, such states do not comply with their chief legal obligation not
to use the aggressive use of force. Weak states employ asymmetric
means to avoid retribution and attribution89 and superpowers
invent new legal rules to stay in the business of using force. Weak
states use terrorists and NSAs as asymmetric tactics to avoid legal
obligations.90 NSAs ignore all IHL obligations; therefore, in modern
warfare, as more NSAs become involved, IHL is losing its relevance.
This shows why civilians are more vulnerable in modern warfare,
and if the goal of IHL altogether is to humanize warfare, then
clearly it is failing to reach this goal.91
Superpowers have also started to use asymmetric tactics of
employing NSAs and other means of supporting rebels and
insurgent groups as proxies of war and to avoid retribution.92
Moreover, powerful states such as the U.S. develop new legal rules,
such as, the “unwilling or unable test,”93 “humanitarian
intervention,”94 the “war on terrorism,” and “preventive selfdefense”95 to circumvent their international legal obligations in
warfare. For example, Israel relied on pre-emptive self-defense to
attack the Osirak nuclear plant in Iraq, by arguing that Israel was
in imminent danger of being attacked by Iraq’s weapons of mass

87. David Rodin, The Ethics of Asymmetric War, in THE ETHICS OF WAR:
SHARED PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS 155 (Richard Sorabji & David
Rodin eds., 2006).
88. See Sewall, supra note 73, at 25–26 (referring to the use of new
technologies or by publicly rejecting the law).
89. Vladyslav Lanovoy, The Use of Force by Non-State Actors and the Limits
of Attribution of Conduct, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 563 (2017); see also Andres B.
Munos et al., Understanding Lawfare in a Hybrid Warfare Context, 37 NATO
LEGAL GAZETTE 5, 11, 25 (2016), www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/
doclibrary/legal_gazette_37a.pdf [hereinafter NATO]; Nadeem Ashraf, The
Pursuit of Hybrid Warfare: Muddling Towards Clarity and Implementation,
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE 7 (Jan. 4, 2017), www.
publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3384.pdf; Press Release, European
Comm’n, Security: EU Strengthens Response to Hybrid Threats (Apr. 6, 2016),
www.ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1227(having been
cited in Ashraf supra, at 7) [hereinafter European Commission].
90. Rodin, supra note 87, at 155.
91. Sewall, supra note 73, at 25–26.
92. NATO, supra note 89; Ashraf, supra note 89; European Commission,
supra note 89.
93. See Deeks, supra note 55 (arguing that states can use defensive force in
response to attacks by NSAs without any involvement or control of host state,
if the host state is unwilling or unable to counter NSAs).
94. See Dadova, supra note 50, (noting that humanitarian intervention
advocates use of force without any self-defense or without UNSC authorization).
95. See Heller, supra note 51 (noting that the notion of preventive selfdefense under which states can use force without occurrence of an armed attack
violates international law).
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destruction.96 The U.S. also justified its use of aggressive force by
relying on the same reasoning—that the aggressive use of force
against a non-materialized or non-crystalized threat of weapons of
mass destruction or imminent threat was justified—without any
basis in international law.97 Later on, it turned out that the
intelligence used to justify these attacks was forged, false, and
baseless.98 Thus, the powerful keep on using aggressive force
without being held accountable and without complying with their
major international legal obligations. So, arguably, the most
pressing issue with law and warfare is compliance with and
enforcement of the international law of war. It is not the case that
there is no law that can stop all of this warfare and violence. The
law that prohibits all use of force is in place; the problem is with
compliance and enforcement. Though international law is easily
enforced by imposing big sanctions on weak states, such as the U.S.
did by imposing them on Iran,99 superpowers stay out of its reach.
Had it been Pakistan or Iran using pre-emptive force on Israel to
take out its nuclear reactors, the world would have invaded Iran or
destroyed the whole of Pakistan and Iran in reaction. But, since it
was Israel and the U.S., no action or punishment was pursued. The
same applies to other aggressions by superpowers, the Libyan War,
the Syrian War, and the Yemeni War: whole countries have been
destroyed and destabilized and no action has been taken against the
superpowers for their war crimes and aggressions.

C. Technologies
The third challenge with the enforcement of international law
in warfare is the advancing technologies and their subsequent
unexplored implications on the law of war. With the advancement
in technologies, aggression in warfare is shifting toward new ways
to wage wars against targeted victims. This includes
cyberwarfare,100 where public and military systems are hacked as a
tactic of warfare to wound the enemy or targeted state.101 For

96. M.J. WILLIAMS, NATO, SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT: FROM
KOSOVO TO KHANDAHAR 96 (2009).
97. SUSAN BREAU, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS: INTERNATIONAL LAW 2013 AND
2014 at 175 (2013).
98. See supra note 75.
99. See also Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T TREAS., www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/programs/pages/iran.aspx (last visited March 20, 2020) (noting
U.S. sanctions on Iran to enforce international law). See generally RICHARD
NEPHEW, THE ART OF SANCTIONS: A VIEW FROM THE FIELD (2017).
100. MICHAEL SCHMITT, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE CYBER WARFARE (2013); see also PAUL DUCHEINE, THE
NOTION OF CYBER OPERATIONS IN RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND CYBER SPACE 2119–228 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds.,
2015).
101. Id.
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instance, Israel used cyberattacks on 200 nuclear centrifuges in
Iran.102 Similarly, in another instance, Israel incapacitated the
Syrian defense system so as not to be able to detect Israeli fighter
plane movements and attacks in Syria.103 The new technologies
used for such attacks make it nearly impossible to detect the
perpetrators of aggression, which in turn makes it difficult to
enforce international laws of war. Likewise, advancement in
biological weapons is creating new avenues for aggression in
warfare. For instance, lab-created viruses can be used as weapons
of tactics of warfare to destroy the economy of a country and to
completely shut down whole countries. Recently, it has been seen
that the coronavirus, for example, has the potential to shut down
whole countries, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of
the view (without one iota of proof) that the U.S. military has
purposefully used this biological weapon to incapacitate the
growing Chinese economy,104 as a geopolitical tactic and as an
aggressive tactic of war. International law in this regard has no
methods to detect and realize the reality in such situations, which
is a lacuna that needs to be filled. It is therefore believed that the
advancement in technologies is creating this gap in the
international laws of warfare,105 which can be exploited by
aggressive states.

102. NICHOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., W32. STUXNET DOSSIER: VERSION 1.4 (FEB.
2011); see also Update 2 - Iran Says Cyber Foes Caused Centrifuge Problems,
REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2010), www.reuters.com/article/iran-ahmadinejadcomputers-idAFLDE6AS1L120101129; Iran Says Nuclear Programme Was Hit
by Sabotage, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east11868596; Christopher Williams, Israeli Security Chief Celebrates Stuxnet
Cyber
Attack,
TELEGRAPH
(Feb.
16,
2011),
www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8326274/Israeli-security-chiefcelebrates-Stuxnet-cyber-attack.html; Kim Zetter, Did a U.S. Government Lab
Help Israel Develop Stuxnet?, WIRED (Jan. 15, 2011), www.wired.com/
2011/01/inl-and-stuxnet; DAVID ALBRIGHT, PAUL BRANNAN, & CHRISTINA
WALROND, ISIS REPORT: STUXNET MALWARE AND NATANZ: UPDATE OF ISIS
DECEMBER 22, 2010 REPORT (2011); Kim Zetter, Report Strengthens Suspicions
that Stuxnet Sabotaged Iran’s Nuclear Plants, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010),
www.wired.com/2010/12/isis-report-on-stuxnet.
103. FRED KAPLAN, DARK TERRITORY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CYBER WAR,
161 (2016); see also Lior Tobanksy, Basic Concepts in Cyber Warfare, 3 Mil. &
Str. Aff. 75, 77–78 (2011); RUSSELL BUCHAN, CYBER ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CYBER SPACE 171-72 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan eds., 2015).
104. Ryan Pickrell, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Pushes
Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory that the US Army “Brought the Epidemic to
Wuhan,” BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2020), www.businessinsider.com/chinese-offici
al-says-us-army-maybe-brought-coronavirus-to-wuhan-2020-3.
105. Sewall, supra note 73, at 26.
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D. Cost of Respecting Law
The final challenge with the enforcement of international laws
of war is the cost of being obliged by the law when the other side is
not.106 If one side to a conflict chooses not to abide by its IHL
obligations when the other side chooses to do so, then the latter will
bear a far heavier cost. For instance, if Side A uses NSAs and
terrorism tactics to fight Side B, and Side B only employs
conventional means to fight Side A, it will be very costly for Side B
to respect all of IHL, because Side A will be deliberately targeting
civilians to bring Side B to its knees. This is the problem the world
is facing in fighting terrorists, that while terrorists hide behind
civilians by using them as human shields, and targeting innocent
children by deliberately attacking schools, the state fighting such
terrorists has to incur a lot of costs by respecting the rules of IHL,
in the form of higher military expenditure costs and lower fighting
efficiency. So the law is enforceable against law-abiding states in
IHL and unenforceable against noncompliant NSAs.107 This gap in
compliance between states and NSAs makes it attractive for
aggressive and weak states to employ more NSAs and use
asymmetric warfare tactics. This is why we are seeing an increase
in the employment of different kinds of NSA in modern warfare. The
international law of warfare needs to look at the issue of
noncompliance mainly in relation to NSAs in order to uphold global
peace and security. Because, as discussed above, most of the
enforcement issues with international laws in warfare are mainly
related to the use of NSAs. The law of war cannot humanize the use
of violence when both the weakest and the most powerful states are
using NSAs to violate IHL and to avoid retribution and attribution.
The simple employment of mercenaries as NSAs absolves a state
from all legal obligations and responsibilities, which in turn enables
aggressive states to violate as many humanitarian contingencies as
they desire.

V. REGULARIZATION
The U.S., as the superpower and the most aggressive state in
the world, sees IHL in a very minimalistic manner by relying
mainly on state practice.108 Relying heavily on state practice is
advantageous in bringing about the formation and development of
customary international practices, and therein help with the
development of customary international law. But it can also be a
concern because it can be steered in every direction by cherry106. Id. at 26–27.
107. See id. at 27 (noting that a non-compliant attitude towards
international law is threatening the legal regime).
108. Id. at 29.
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picking state practices that suit the aggressive state’s narrative.
For instance, though international law explicitly prohibits all sorts
of use of force without self-defense, powerful states have routinely
relied upon ill-founded customary international law by quoting
examples of past and present practices. These rules derived by state
practices include the unwilling or unable test109 and the likes of
anticipatory self-defense,110 which conveniently avoid the UN
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and the need for UNSC
authorization. The argument is that state practices can be used to
justify any aggression. For instance, U.S. aggressions can
demonstrate that customary state practices allow aggression in oilrich countries even when done in reliance on false or forged
pretenses. The U.S. alone has been a major aggressor by invading
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the likes of Syria through
illegitimate, false, and forged reasons. For instance, the U.S.
invaded Iraq without any actual armed attack against it111 by
arguing that it was undertaken in anticipated self-defense
supported by state practice. The U.S. claimed that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction, which later proved to be based upon
forged and false intelligence documents.112 Similarly, Israel did the
same to attack an Iraqi nuclear plant, by relying on an anticipated
armed attack.113 So, if we see such state practices of aggression, it
can be argued that any state can be attacked under anticipated selfdefense, without worrying about any actual armed attack114—which
is needed under the UN Charter115—while relying on forged or false
claims or documents. But, would be right to invade a country
without an actual armed attack, and that too upon false
intelligence? Relying on state practices says, yes, it would be
justified, because such state practices have existed in the past. So,
the argument this Article is making here is that relying on state
practice leaves a lot of gray areas that can avoid the basic
international laws enshrined in the UN Charter that are
responsible for global peace and security. Aggressive states,
therefore, find ways to avoid their international legal obligations by
circumventing the legal requirements.

A. Military Targets
In the principle of distinction, only military targets can be

109. Deeks, supra note 55.
110. Heller, supra note 51.
111. See supra note 75.
112. Id.
113. See WILLIAMS, supra note 94 at 96 (noting that Israel attacked on Iraq’s
nuclear project in anticipation of its future use).
114. Heller, supra note 51.
115. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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attacked to further military objectives, to safeguard civilian lives.116
Similarly, the principle of precaution also hinges upon the
lawfulness of a target.117 But aggressive states interpret “military
targets” so vaguely and broadly that it can also cover civilian
targets. The Geneva Conventions define military targets as objects
of “an effective contribution to military action,” and the destruction
of such objects must offer “a definite military advantage.”118 By
contrast, civilian targets are objects that offer no military
advantages.119 Direct military forces and their assets are plain and
simple to understand, but the problem with defining military
objectives starts with the indirect military objectives that provide
support and sustenance to military forces and objectives. The
international community defines and interprets military objectives
narrowly to humanize war and to protect civilian lives and
objectives. By contrast, the U.S. defines and interprets military
objects broadly to include general infrastructure and civilian objects
during wars.120 This broader definition or interpretation of military
targets can be linked to the U.S.’s desire to effectively fight a war,
by crippling a targeted state. Scholars with broad interpretations
sometimes argue that electricity grids or transportation grids can
be considered military targets because they are also used by
military forces, but this has to serve a military advantage and be
constrained by other IHL requirements.121 On the other hand,
progressive scholars who take a narrow interpretation do not
believe that roads, transportation, and electricity grids should be
targeted during wars, because they adversely affect civilian lives.122
However, the bigger problem arises when civilian objects are
considered military objects.
On the one hand, the progressive view of the international law
holds that a reasonable expectation or a nexus should be there to
prove that a civilian object contributes to the military objectives.123
On the other hand, the U.S. believes that a mere future possibility
without any actual nexus or expectation is enough to consider a
civilian object a military target.124 The U.S. specifically asserts that
“some plausible future military purpose would be sufficient to
render a normally civilian media facility a military objective.”125 In
the Iraq War, for instance, the U.S. considered Iraqi media firms to
be military targets and attacked them, loosely arguing that the
songs played on those channels were used to direct Iraqi forces.
116. AP1, supra note 4, at art. 49.
117. Id. art. 57.
118. Id. art. 52(2).
119. Id. art. 52(3).
120. Sewall, supra note 70 at 33.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Human Rights Watch refuted such claims and asserted that there
was no evidence to suggest that the Iraqi media outlets that were
attacked by the U.S. were in any way used to direct Iraqi military
forces.126
The U.S.’s broad interpretation of military targets, and its
desire to include civilian targets of national importance under
military targets upon loose relations, is also clearly reflected in the
U.S. Operational Law Handbook, which states that classifying a
civilian object as a military target “is dependent upon its value to
an enemy nation’s war fighting or war-sustaining effort including
its ability to be converted to a more direct connection . . . , and not
solely to its overt or present connection or use.”127 This U.S.
interpretation of military targets is too broad and relies on future
unreasonable possibilities. Therefore, the international community
believes that the U.S.’s interpretation of military targets is too
broad and easily includes civilian objects as military targets.128 The
ICRC commented that, with the U.S.’s broad interpretation of
military targets, “every object could in abstracto, under possible
future developments, e.g., if used by enemy troops, become a
military objective.”129
There is a similar problem in the U.S. definition of civilian
objects. While Additional Protocol 1 (“AP1”) to the Geneva
Conventions defines non-civilian objects as objectives that
“effectively contribute in military action,”130 the U.S. describes noncivilian objects as ones that contribute to “war sustaining
capability.”131 Critics of US regularization of warfare see the US
version of non-civilian objects as a wider interpretation of what is
meant in AP1, meaning that “war sustaining objects” include more
civilian objects than objects with “effective military contribution.”132
This broadening of classifying non-civilian objects, in the ICRC
experts’ opinion, is mainly “to abandon the limitation to military
objectives and to admit attacks on political, financial (e.g. main
export industry, the stock market or taxation authorities) and
psychological targets as long as they include the possibility or the

126. See supra note 74.
127. LCDR DAVID H. LEE, JAGC, USN, ET. AL., OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK: INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT 22 (MAJ
TEMI ANDERSON ET AL. EDS., 2015). Janina Dill, The 21st-Century Belligerent’s
Trilemma, 26 THE EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 83, 95 (2015) (punctuation and
emphasis omitted).
128. Sewall, supra note 71 at 33–34.
129. Marco Sassòli, Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International
Humanitarian Law: Background Paper Prepared for the Informal High-Level
Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. RESEARCH INITIATIVE (Jun. 2004).
[hereinafter Sassòli].
130. Sewall, supra note 71 at 33–34.
131. Id. at 34.
132. Id. at 34.
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decision (which are two different things) of the enemy to continue
war. Those who suggest a large interpretation of the concept of
military objectives mention that targeting of bank accounts,
financial institutions, shops, and entertainment sites may prove in
the long run more destructive than attacks on dual-use targets.”133
In practice, the U.S. used this broad interpretation of non-civilian
objects by targeting industries and economic factions in Kosovo,
mainly attacking Milosevic’s political allies. While AP1 clearly does
not allow the targeting of economic and financial civilian factions
during warfare by principle of distinction, the U.S. relied on the
sustainability of war: that it did what it did to cripple Kosovo’s
ability to continue war.134
This broad categorization of civilian objects is fairly similar to
the approach of terrorist organizations. Terrorists also target
civilian objects such as mosques, schools, and hospitals to be able to
cripple a state and exhaust its resources in the security and
restoration of its infrastructure. For instance, in Pakistan, Balochi
insurgents used to blow up gas pipelines using rocket attacks to
exhaust Baluchistan’s135 budget and law enforcing/sustaining
capabilities. In a similar fashion, the U.S. is also using civilian
targets to destabilize a state only to win the war. And, if the
criterion of success in war is to win—a “contribution to a military
objective” that translates into winning—then in abstracto
everything is fair in war. The losing side can always argue that it
did what it did to win, and it will always be right,136 whereas the
winning side will always argue that what it did, in fact, was
contribute to the success. In both cases, everything can be done to
win, even violations of humanitarian laws. This explains why
modern warfare includes so much devastation of civilian objects:
both parties to a conflict, including NSAs and aggressors (but not
the victims of aggression), are trying to win a war by any means
possible. They can legally justify their actions by arguing that their
actions have indeed contributed to military objectives.
What if, instead, we apply the same criterion of a military
objective, and the requirement of sustaining war capabilities, to the
U.S. or other aggressors of war? If the targeting of civilian financial
factions such as bank accounts, industries, electric grids,
transportation systems, dual-purpose systems, and stock exchanges
is allowed during war in the hope of ending or winning the war or

133. Sassòli, supra note 124.
134. Sewall, supra note 71 at 34.
135. Militants Blow up Gaspipe Line in Dera Bugti, DAWN (Jan. 27, 2014),
www.dawn.com/news/1083050/militants-blow-up-gas-pipeline-in-dera-bugti.
136. PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR & PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL AND MORAL ISSUES 171 (2d ed., 1999). Thomas Nagel asserted that
“[I]n situations of deadly conflict, particularly where a weaker party is
threatened with annihilation or enslavement by a stronger one, the argument
for resort to atrocities can be powerful, and the dilemma acute”.
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merely stopping a war as a military objective, then would it be okay
for Syria to target equivalent civilian objects in New York or
Washington to win the Syrian War and to end American atrocities
and illegal intervention in Syria? When compared to the Syrian
perspective, the American stance used during illegal and aggressive
interpretations, based on flimsy justifications, such as the Iraqi
War, which relied on false intelligence of weapons of mass
destruction,137 is less justified: the U.S. is fighting for its political
interests,138 creating violence, and disturbing global peace and
security. Syrian use of force against the U.S. would be in selfdefense, and its actions would be as a last resort for the sake of its
survival against illegitimate aggression. In theory, Syrian use of
defensive force, if for the sake of survival, is more legitimate than
the illegitimate and aggressive use of force by the U.S. to change
the Assad regime.139 But, under international law, if the survival of
Syria is not in imminent danger, then the Syrian defensive use of
force on civilian objects in the U.S. is unlawful.140 Sewall is of the
view that the reinterpretation or development of IHL is unlikely to
change the US’s behavior or views.141

B. Enforcement
Though progressive IHL is shifting more toward humanizing
violence and warfare, in practice noncompliance with and
nonenforcement of these laws is increasing. By contrast, more
civilians and civilian objects are being affected and destroyed in
modern warfare.142 The international community is trying to
protect civilian lives through the law, and by interpreting law to a
greater extent, but the real problem lies with the enforcement of
and compliance with the existing laws. Of course, there is an issue
137. See supra note 75.
138. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Nat’l Sec. & Def.,
(THE WHITE HOUSE, Apr. 8, 2017), www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/l
etter-president-speaker-house-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate.
139. To see a war with interest of regime change see Miriam Valverde, Why
Tulsi Gabbard Calls the War in Syria a Regime Change War, POLITIFACT (Oct.
16, 2019), www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2019/oct/16/why-tulsi-gabb
ard-calls-war-syria-regime-change-wa. See also Krishnadev Calamur, The
Trump Administration Appears to Embrace Regime Change in Syria in an
About-Face, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Said of Bashar al-Assad: It Would
Seem There Would be No Role for Him to Govern the Syrian People, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2017), www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/u
s-syria-policy/522117.
140. AP1, supra note 5, at art. 48; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996), ICJ, at ¶ 96–97 (noting that
nuclear weapons are only allowed in cases where the existence of a state is
under a threat).
141. Sewall, supra note 73, at 36.
142. Sewall, supra note 73, at 38–39.
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with the interpretation of laws and their continual interpretations,
which are being used to justify war crimes and aggressions. But,
even where the law is self-explanatory, it is proven to have been
violated by superpowers by waging illegitimate interventions in
weak countries; the legal system that is supposed to protect the
weak from aggression seems to be ineffective. For instance, even
after being proved that the Iraqi invasion was fought on flimsy and
false justifications,143 no action against the U.S. has been taken to
prosecute war crimes, and the Bush administration was not held
responsible for its illegal aggression in Iraq. Had it been Iran or
North Korea, the international media and the international
community would be so quick to enforce the law of war, and to
prosecute aggressors. So, arguably, it may sound clichéd, but the
law of war is only good and efficient against self-complying states
and weak states; it is ineffectual against superpowers, chiefly the
U.S..
It is primarily the ICC that is responsible for enforcing
violations of war crimes and the prohibition on the use of force. The
ICC can enforce the international law of warfare, and it can make
states comply with international legal obligations while deterring
violations and violence, but powerful political leaders and war
criminals are indicted by the ICC even at the same time that they
are violating international law. The scope of this Article does not
allow going into greater detail to examine the successes and failures
of the ICC. In short, ICC has indicted thirty war criminals and other
powerful political leaders who have committed heinous war
crimes.144 The extent of this issue can be understood by the U.S.’s
attitude toward war crime, in which the U.S. threatened to arrest
ICC judges if they tried to pursue cases of American war crimes.145
Despite the increase in gross violations of IHL and the prohibition
on the use of force, the international community in the response is
more concerned with writing new laws, interpreting the existing
laws through conferences and research papers, and making new
agreements. This may seem satisfactory, but it is not effective in
controlling the abuse of law in warfare. Nonetheless, international
watchdogs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
play their unparalleled role in documenting violations of the
international law of warfare. However, the international
community is not concentrating on the great need to enforce the
143. See supra note 75; see also Sean Lengell, Durbin Kept Silent on Prewar
Knowledge, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2007), www.web.archive.org/web/200704290
45319/http://washtimes.com/national/20070427-124842-1706r.htm (noting that
Durbin had pre-war knowledge of Iraqi invasion, suggesting that Iraq war was
pre-planned).
144. Sewall, supra note 73, at 39.
145. US Threatens to Arrest ICC Judges if They Pursue Americans for
Afghan War Crimes, FRANCE24, www.france24.com/en/20180910-usa-trump-t
hreatens-arrest-icc-judges-american-soldiers-afghan-war-crimes (last updated
Sept. 11, 2018).

540

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

international law of warfare.146
This is not because of weak domestic prosecution systems; the
U.S. possesses the most highly trained legal profession and internal
rule of law. Then why is there no enforcement of war crimes through
dedicated prosecution systems in the U.S.? In hundreds of military
campaigns by the U.S., where international organizations have
reported gross violations of IHL, only a handful of cases have come
to the limelight. Is it because most cases do not reach international
attention? Is it because the U.S. leadership does not want to press
charges against its comrades who violate IHL? Or is it because the
U.S. armed forces are intentionally protected by the U.S. leadership
against possible prosecutions? The U.S. threat to arrest ICC judges
in relation to the prosecution of American war criminals147 suggests
that the American leadership does not wish to prosecute war
criminals.
A unique case gives us some perspective on this issue. In 2005,
during the Haditha incident in Iraq, U.S. military forces went door
to door in civilian houses and murdered dozens of innocent children
at point-blank range and killed an old man in a wheelchair.148 This
war crime did not come to the world’s attention through the chain
of command in the U.S. armed forces or through the U.S.
prosecution system but through journalism. In fact, the U.S. armed
forces’ chain of command tried to suppress this information, which
raises the question: how many such incidents go below the radar?149
Even when the U.S. prosecution system catches and prosecutes
violations of IHL, it is not a typical prosecution of a war criminal.
Instead, it is merely a legal process that punishes violations of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. This means that the American
judicial system that prosecutes IHL violations does not punish war
crimes per se; it merely considers them small violations of the
Uniform Code, by giving minimal punishments against heinous war
crimes. For instance, in 1968, Lt. William Calley was found to have
killed hundreds of Vietnamese and only one soldier at My Lai
village, for which he only served a measly three-and-a-half-year
house arrest.150 Similarly, in the Haditha killing incident in Iraq,
most of the military officers found guilty only faced pay cuts,
dismissals, or reductions in rank; no jail time or serious punishment
was imposed.151 This only shows the level of U.S. commitment
toward the enforcement and respect for international humanitarian

146. Sewall, supra note 73, at 39–40.
147. US Threatens to Arrest ICC Judges if They Pursue Americans for
Afghan War Crimes, FRANCE24 (last updated Sept. 11, 2018), www.fran
ce24.com/en/20180910-usa-trump-threatens-arrest-icc-judges-americansoldiers-afghan-war-crimes.
148. Sewall, supra note 73 at 40.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 40–41.
151. Id.
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laws as a global leader and a superpower. If the Haditha incident
does not deserve any serious punishment, such as life imprisonment
or the death penalty, then what incident or level of abuse of IHL
does? In incidents where military targets are closely related to
civilian lives, prosecuting war criminals is difficult. So, incidents
like Haditha are the benchmark of the seriousness of war crimes.
The Haditha incident and related law enforcement show the level
of commitment the world holds toward respect for IHL and the
protection of civilian lives. It clearly shows the relation between law
and warfare. It proves that the enforcement of the international law
of warfare is ineffective and unenforceable. The Haditha incident
may be merely a small incident in eyes of many, but what about the
prosecution of perpetrators who have violated all the laws of war by
illegitimately invading victim states, killing millions of innocent
people, and dispersing millions more? What about the prosecution
of war crimes against aggressors of war who not only devastated
many countries but also destabilized whole regions?

VI. CONCLUSION
Law is the necessary restraint that limits violence in warfare
and that seeks to end wars.152 It intends to enforce conditions that
foster peace in the community.153 Today, sovereigns are regularized
by the super-sovereign by the jus ad bellum enshrined in the UN
Charter, which regulates who can use force and in what
conditions,154 and by the humanitarian laws of war encoded in the
Geneva and Hague Conventions, which proscribe ways in which
force cannot be used, restricting the powers of a sovereign.155
However, recently, the volatile nature of fighting terrorists and
NSAs has transformed the dynamics of the modern international
laws of war seeking to restrict violence. The line that marks the
difference between aggression and self-defense has been blurred,156
as has the distinction between combatants and non-combatants
through the excessive employment of NSAs and asymmetric
warfare techniques.157 This transformation is making it difficult for
the international community to efficiently regularize the ways of
152. Id.
153. KELSEN, supra note 18 at 36–39. Douglas et al., supra note 15 at 6.
154. See U.N. Charter Art. 2(4) & 41-51 (asserting that “[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”).
155. See supra note 5.
156. RUYS, supra note 40, at 107.
157. ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 203 (Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans, & Adam
Henschke eds., 2013). See also, DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE
DYNAMICS OF COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF
MILITARY MIGHT 196 (2002).
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war and to restrict warfare/violence, and violence and warfare are
again on the rise. Therefore, it can be argued that the Hobbesian
theory of lawless war, though refuted in theory, still holds ground
in practice.
In modern warfare, methods of warfare are cleverly designed
after much thought to overcome restrictions on the use of force, for
which vague customary international law and state practice have
been developed and exploited to justify illegitimate interventions.
For instance, the principles of the responsibility to protect (R2P),158
humanitarian intervention159 (without UNSC authorization), and
preventive self-defense160 were wrongly used to justify illegal
warfare by aggressive states. But, with the passage of time, all uses
of force justified by these principles were rejected and deconstructed
by the international community if undertaken without self-defense
or UNSC authorization. In current times, the unwilling or unable
test161 has been used in the Syrian War to justify the use of force
without an actual armed attack from the Syrian state. When the
law is subjugated and bent in such a fashion, it is used as a tool to
authorize aggressive wars, and when the law is used to humanize
and regulate warfare through humanitarian rules, it is used as a
restraint.
While domestic legal systems enforce obligations involving
individuals, the notion of reciprocity in international law, especially
in the law of warfare, is concerned with the legal obligations
between states.162 Reciprocity is used in international agreements
to enforce cooperation and to deter violations,163 by levying
reciprocal state obligations. Empirical data has shown evidence of
reciprocity even in state practice in international relations.164
Reciprocity has been statistically proven to be more efficient in

158. David Chandler, Unravelling the Paradox of the Responsibility to
Protect 20, IRISH STUDIES IN INT’L AFFAIRS 27–39 (2009).
159. See Dadova, supra note 47 (noting that humanitarian intervention
advocates use of force without any self-defense or without UNSC authorization).
160. See Heller, supra note 51 (noting that the notion of preventive selfdefense under which states can use force without occurrence of an armed attack,
violates international law).
161. Qureshi, supra note 52; Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Examining the
Legitimacy and Reasonableness of the Use of Force: From Just War Doctrine to
the Unwilling-or-Unable Test, 42 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 221 (2018).
162. To see more detailed analyses on how the principle of reciprocity
manages obligations between states in the laws of war, see work of Watts, who
has furnished a detailed overview on reciprocal obligations in the Geneva
Conventions, the Hague Conventions, customary international law, and other
laws of war. See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Laws of War, 50 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 365 (2009).
163. ROGER HOPKINS BURKE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 137 (2013).
164. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN & JOHN R. FREEMAN, THREE-WAY STREET:
STRATEGIC RECIPROCITY IN WORLD POLITICS 26-29 (1990). See Morrow, supra
note 60, at 1.
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deterring violations and ensuring states’ compliance.165 It is similar
to the prisoner’s dilemma, where two rational beings are likely not
to cooperate with each other because both are better off by not
cooperating at the expense of each other.166 However, it is not
necessary that a state will exactly mirror a situation in response to
any violation or adversity. It is also possible to reciprocate violations
with other forms of retaliation. perceived as a weaker form of
reciprocity in warfare. Reciprocity is a form of retaliation, which is
proportional and responsive in nature. Moreover, in cases of
violations of IHL, states do not choose to reciprocate such actions
with violations, since the legal obligations to humanize warfare are
internalized in states’ behaviors.167
The progressive international law community, therefore,
continues to refine the legal principles to humanize warfare.168
Contrary to these efforts, the international law of warfare is
becoming less relevant every day. Firstly, powerful states that
aggressively use force do not respect their legal obligations in
international law. Secondly, the use of NSAs, and terrorist
organizations that employ them, also do not abide by the
humanitarian legal principles that protect civilians, and they
violate all the basic legal principles without fear.169 So there is the
non-compliant attitude of both NSAs and superpowers toward the
legal obligations of IHL and the UN Charter, and there is no law
enforcement that punishes the war crimes or aggressors of war.
Even if it is known that a war was initiated on the wrong premises,
and the aggressor itself acknowledges its mistake, superpower
perpetrators are not held accountable by the international
community. Therefore, the international community should now not
focus on the progression or refinement of the legal obligations in
international law. Instead, a more sensible vision should be to work
toward the practicality of legal obligations, and toward compliance,
enforcement,170 and the punishment of war crimes. Only then does
the law have any sort of value, because law without enforcement is
just ink on paper.
There are a number of challenges that lay the foundations of
the non-compliant and disrespectful attitude toward IHL. The first
is the existence of NSAs. Terrorism is increasing, because the socalled enemies of terrorism are also fueling it behind their backs, by
sponsoring and aiding NSAs,171 whether in the form of support to
165. MORROW, supra note 60 at 131, 144.
166. See MORROW, supra note 60, at 290 (referring to his Chapter 2
discussion on Prisoner’s Dilemma Nash Equilibria & Pareto Optimal).
167. BRYAN PEELER, THE PERSISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 12 (2019).
168. Sewall, supra note 73 at 23.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 39-41 (noting complications in prosecuting U.S war criminals
to enforce humanitarian law).
171. House Approves US Arms for Syrian Rebels, AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 17,

544

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

NSAs and indirect flow of weapons to terrorist organizations172 or
by arming rebel and insurgent groups against the host state. A
simple solution to all this disarray would be a complete ban on the
use of NSAs and on the clandestine use of armed forces without any
uniforms. Any sort of help, support, and training provided to NSAs
by any state should be not only banned but also considered a war
crime, which should be enforced and deterred by imposing hefty
sanctions and punishments.
The second problem with the enforcement of law of warfare and
IHL is with states’ compliance. Weak states use asymmetric tactics
to overcome their weaknesses in military power,173 while
superpowers argue they have not violated their international legal
obligations by finding new lacunas in the system.174 Aggressive
states develop new legal rules such as the “unwilling or unable
test,”175 “humanitarian intervention,”176 the “war on terrorism,” and
“pre-emptive self-defense”177 to circumvent the international legal
obligations of warfare. The third challenge with the enforcement of
international law on warfare is of advancing technologies and its
subsequent unexplored implications on the law of war. The final
challenge with the enforcement of international laws of war is the
cost of complying with the laws when the other side does not.178 So
the law is enforceable against law-abiding states in IHL, and it is
2014), america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/17/congress-arming-syriarebels.ht
ml. See also Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret US Support
for Syrian Rebels, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012), www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sy
ria-obama-order/exclusive-obama-authorizes-secret-u-s-support-for-syrianrebels-idUSBRE8701OK20120801; Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman & Michael
S. Schmidt, Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A. War in Syria,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/ciasyria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html; Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid
Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014),
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unenforceable against noncompliant NSAs.179 This gap in
compliance between states and NSAs makes it attractive for
aggressive and weak states to employ more NSAs and use
asymmetric warfare tactics. This is why we are seeing an increase
in the employment of different kinds of NSA in modern warfare. The
international law of warfare needs to look at the issue of
noncompliance mainly in relation to NSAs in order to uphold global
peace and security, Because, as discussed above, most enforcement
issues with international laws in warfare are mainly related to the
use of NSAs.

179. See id. at 27 (noting that non-compliant attitude towards international
law is threatening the legal regime).
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